B 561 
.D52 E5 
1904 
COPY 1 



VH'TPfT 



m 



EPICTETUS 



1 




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Book SiLS 

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DISCOURSES 
Epiefems 




Selections 



tt.M.C*Jdwell Co. 
New York** Boston. 



3gt» 



I0N3RESS 

M 1904 
?mmm. em 

GLASS ^XXo. No. 

v 7 /T> 



Copyright, 1904 
B#<l£ M. Cai,dwioi,i, Co. 



v. 



O 






Discourses of Epictetus 



Introduction 

T7*EW facts of the life of Epictetus are 
known to us at the present time. 
He was a native of Hierapolis, in Phry- 
gia, and in some manner became the slave 
of Epaphroditus, a follower of Nero. 
He was lame, some authors claiming 
he had been so from early years, while 
others assert that his leg was broken 
by his master. By a decree of Domitian 
the philosophers were banished from 
Rome, and Epictetus moved to Nicopo- 
lis, a city of Epirus, where he taught. 



•$H Introduction 



The date of his birth and death are un- 
known, but it is claimed by some that 
he returned to Rome in the reign of 
Hadrian, in which case he must have 
lived to an extreme old age. 

Three topics are mentioned by Epic- 
tetus upon which the whole of the Stoic 
philosophy was based: the Desires and 
Aversions, the Pursuits and Avoidances, 
and the Assents of the understanding. 

The Desires and Aversions were 
simple affections of the mind, Good 
always being the object of Desire, and 
Evil the object of Aversion. 

As the Desires and Aversions were 
simple affections, the Pursuits and 
Avoidances were exertions of the active 
powers toward procuring the Desires 
and Aversions. Under this head was 
comprehended the whole system of moral 



Introduction t# 

duties, for where the inclinations were 
restrained and exerted, as they should be, 
there would be nothing to mislead in 
action. 

As the Pursuits and Avoidances were 
to produce a security from failure in 
practice, the Assents were to secure an 
infallibility in judgment, and guard the 
mind from admitting a falsehood, or 
dissenting from truth. 

The subjects of these various classes 
were the Appearances, — the impres- 
sions made on the soul by any objects 
presented to the senses or understanding. 
The use of the Appearances the Stoics 
considered as common to brutes and 
men, but an intelligent use belonged only 
to the latter. 

The judgment that was formed by 
the mind concerning the Appearances 
3 



«$H Introduction 

they termed Principles, and these prin- 
ciples gave a determination to the 
Choice. 

The Choice signified either the faculty 
of willing, or a deliberate election made 
of some action or course of life. 

As the Appearances respect particu- 
lar objects, the Preconceptions were 
general innate notions, such as they sup- 
posed to take original possession of the 
mind, before it formed any of its own. 

Epictetus himself wrote nothing, and 
the Discourses as they have come down 
to us are by Arrian, a devoted disciple 
of his and later the historian of Alex- 
ander the Great. Photius has enumer- 
ated eight books of the Discourses, and 
twelve of the Conversations; besides 
these there is the Enchiridion, made up of 
selections from the Discourses. Now, 
4 



Introduction 



?TT 



however, there are extant but four books 
of the Discourses, from which the 
present selections are made, and the 
Enchiridion. 



BOOK I. 



Discourses of Epictetus 



OF THE THINGS WHICH ARE, AND 
ARE NOT, IN OUR POWER 

VXfHAT says Jupiter? " O Epicte- 
tus, if it were possible, I would 
have made this little body and property 
of thine free, and not liable to hindrance. 
But now do not mistake: it is not thine 
own, but only a finer mixture of clay. 
Since, then, I could not give thee this, I 
have given thee a certain portion of my- 
self: this faculty of exerting the powers 
9 



#4 Discourses of Epictetus 

of pursuit and avoidance, of desire and 
aversion; and, in a word, the faculty 
of using the appearances of things. 
Taking care of this point, and consider- 
ing it thy possession, thou wilt never be 
restrained, never be hindered; thou wilt 
not groan, wilt not complain, wilt not 
flatter any one. How then! Do all 
these advantages seem small to thee?" 
Heaven forbid! Be content with them, 
and thank the gods. 

But now, when it is in our power to 
take care of one thing, and to apply to 
one, we choose rather to take care of 
many, and to encumber ourselves with 
many; body, property, brother, friend, 
child, and slave; and by this multi- 
plicity of encumbrances we are burdened 
and weighed down. Thus, when the 
weather doth not happen to be fair for 
10 



Discourses of Epictetus H£ 

sailing, we sit fretting, and perpetually 
looking out. — Which way is the wind ? 
— North. What have we to do with 
that ? — When will the west blow ? — 
When it chooses, friend, or when i^olus 
pleases; for Jupiter has not made you 
dispenser of the winds, but iEolus. 

What, then, is to be done ? 

To make the best of what is in our 
power, and take the rest as it naturally 
happens. 

And how is that? 

As it pleases God. 

Thrasea used to say, " I would rather 
be killed to-day than banished to-mor- 
row." But how did Rufus answer him ? 
" If you choose death as the heavier mis- 
fortune, how great is the folly of your 
choice! But if as the lighter, who has 
given you the choice? Why do you not 



#1 Discourses of Epictetus 

study to be content with what has been 
given you ? " 

When word was brought to Agrip- 
pinus that his cause was trying in the 
Senate, he said, — " Good luck attend it. 

— But it is eleven o'clock" (the hour 
when he used to exercise before bath- 
ing) : " Let us go to our exercise." 
When it was over a messenger tells him, 
" You are condemned." " To banish- 
ment," says he, " or death? " " To ban- 
ishment." — "What of my estate?" 

— " It is not taken away." — " Well, 
then, let us go as far as Aricia, and dine 
there." 

This it is to have studied what ought 
to be studied; to have rendered our 
desires and aversions incapable of being 
restrained, or incurred. I must die: if 
instantly, I will die instantly; if in a 



Discourses of Epictetus H£ 

short time, I will dine first; and when 
the hour comes, then I will die. How? 
As becomes one who restores what is 
not his own. (I. i.) 



*3 



«£H Discourses of Epictetus 



OF PRESERVING OUR CHARACTER 

It happens that different things are 
reasonable and unreasonable, as well as 
good and bad, advantageous and disad- 
vantageous, to different persons. On 
this account, chiefly, we stand in need 
of a liberal education, to teach us to 
adapt the preconceptions of the reason- 
able and unreasonable to particular 
cases, conformably to nature. But to 
judge of the reasonable and unreason- 
able, we make use not only of a due 
estimation of things beyond our control, 
but of what relates to each person's par- 
ticular character. 

When Vespasian had sent to forbid 
U 



Discourses of Epictetus ?# 

Priscus Helvidius going to the senate, 

the latter answered, " It is in your power 

to prevent my continuing a senator ; 

but while I am one, I must go." — 

" Well then, at least be silent there." — 

" Do not ask my opinion, and I will 

be silent." — " But I must ask it." — 

" And I must speak what appears to 

me to be right." — " But if you do, I 

will put you to death." — " Did I ever 

tell you that I was immortal? You will 

do your part, and I mine: It is yours 

to kill, and mine to die without fear; 

yours to banish me, mine to depart 

untroubled. " 

What good, then, did Priscus do, 

who was but a single person? Why, 

what good does the purple 1 do to the 

1 An allusion to the purple border which dis- 
tinguishes the dress of the Roman nobility. 



#4 Discourses of Epictetus 

garment? What but being a shining 
character in himself, and setting a good 
example to others? Another, perhaps, 
if in such circumstances Caesar had for- 
bidden his going to the senate, would 
have answered, "I am obliged to you 
for excusing me." But such a one Ves- 
pasian would not have forbidden to 
go, well knowing that he would either 
sit like a statue, or, if he spoke, he would 
say what Caesar wished, and would add 
even more. 

Only consider at what price you sell 
your own will and choice, man: if for 
nothing else, that you may not sell it 
for a trifle. Greatness indeed, and ex- 
cellence, perhaps belong to others, to 
such as Socrates. 

Why, then, as we are born with a like 



16 



Discourses of Epictetus Hr 

nature, do not all, or the greater number, 
become such as he? 

Why, are all horses swift? Are all 
dogs trained for hunting? What then, 
because I am naturally dull, shall I neg- 
lect all care of myself? Heaven forbid! 
Epictetus cannot equal Socrates; but 
if he can approach him this is enough 
for me. I shall never be Milo, and yet 
I do not neglect my body; nor Crcesus, 
and yet I do not neglect my property: 
nor, in general, do we omit the care of 
anything belonging to us, from a despair 
of arriving at the highest degree of per- 
fection. (I. ii.) 



17 



Discourses of Epictetus 



OF THE DOCTRINE THAT GOD IS THE 
FATHER OF MANKIND 

If a person could be persuaded to 
assent to this doctrine as he ought, that 
we are all originally descended from 
God, and that he is the Father of gods 
and men, I conceive he would never 
think meanly or unworthily- of himself. 
Suppose Caesar were to adopt you, there 
would be no bearing your haughty looks : 
and will you not be elated on knowing 
yourself to be the son of Jupiter? Yet, 
in fact, we are not elated; but having 
two things in our composition, intimately 
united, a body in common with the 
18 



Discourses of Epictetus H£ 

brutes, and reason and sentiment in 
common with the gods, many incline to 
the unhappy and mortal kindred, and 
only some few to the divine and 
happy one. And, as necessarily every 
one must treat each particular thing, 
according to the notions he forms about 
it; so those few, who think they are 
made for fidelity, decency, and a well- 
grounded use of the appearances of 
things, never think meanly or unworth- 
ily of themselves. But with the multi- 
tude the case is contrary: " For what 
am I? A poor, contemptible man, with 
this miserable flesh of mine." Miserable, 
indeed. But you have likewise some- 
thing better than this paltry flesh. Why 
then, do you overlook the better, and 
pine away in attention to your less 
worthy kinship? (I. iii.) 
19 



#£ Discourses of Epictetus 



OF PROGRESS AND IMPROVEMENT 

Now if virtue promises happiness, 
prosperity, and ease, then progress 
toward virtue is certainly progress 
toward each of these. For to whatever 
point the perfecting of anything abso- 
lutely leads us, improvement is always 
an approach toward that point. 

How happens it then, that when we 
admit virtue promises such, yet we seek, 
and make an ostentatious show of prog- 
ress in other things? What is the 
product of virtue? 

A prosperous life. 

Who is in a state of progression then ? 
20 



Discourses of Epictetus *# 

He who hath read the many treatises of 
Chrysippus? Why, doth virtue consist 
in having read Chrysippus through? If 
it doth, improvement is confessedly noth- 
ing else than understanding a great deal 
of Chrysippus. 

Where is improvement, then? 

If any of you, withdrawing himself 
from externals, turns to his own faculty 
of choice, exercising, finishing, and ren- 
dering it conformable to nature, — ele- 
vated, free, unrestrained, unhindered, 
faithful, and decent: if he hath learned, 
too, that whoever desires, or is averse 
to things out of his own power can 
neither be faithful nor free, but must 
necessarily change and be tossed up 
and down with them as in a tempest, 
and must necessarily too be subject to 
others, who can procure what he de- 

21 



$H Discourses of Epictetus 



sires or present what he is averse to: 
if, rising in the morning, he observes 
and keeps to these rules; bathes and 
eats as a man of fidelity and honour ; and 
thus, on every subject of action, exer- 
cises himself in his principal duty, — as 
a racer, in the business of racing, as a 
public speaker, in the business of exercis- 
ing his voice, — this is he who truly 
improves; this is he who hath not trav- 
elled in vain. But if he is wholly intent 
on reading books, and hath laboured that 
point only, and travelled for that, I 
bid him go home immediately, and not 
neglect his domestic affairs; for he hath 
travelled in vain. The only real thing 
is, studying how to rid his life of lamen- 
tation, and complaint, and " Alas ! " 
and " I am undone," and misfortune, 
and disappointment; and to learn what 



Discourses of Epictetus ¥& 

death, what exile, what prison, what 
poison is, that in a prison he may be 
able to say, like Socrates, " My dear 
Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus 
let it be"; and not — "Wretched old 
man, have I kept my gray hairs for 
this!" 

Of what service, then, is Chrysippus 
to us? 

To teach you that those things are not 
false on which prosperity and ease de- 
pend. " Take my books, and you will 
see how true and conformable to nature 
those things are which render me free 
from care." How great a happiness! 
And how great the benefactor who shows 
the way ! To Triptolemus all men have 
raised temples and altars, because he gave 
us food through tilling the soil; but to 
him who hath discovered, and brought to 
2 3 



-SH Discourses of Epictetus 

light, and communicated the truth to all, 
— the means not of living, but of living 
well; who among you ever raised an 
altar or a temple, or dedicated a statue, 
or who worships God on that account? 
We offer sacrifices on the account of 
those who have given us corn and the 
vine; and shall we not give thanks to 
God, for those who have produced that 
fruit in the human understanding, by 
which they proceed to discover to us 
the true doctrine of happiness? (I. iv.) 



24 



Discourses of Epictetus Hr 



OF PROVIDENCE 

From every event that happens in the 
world it is easy to praise Providence, if 
a person hath but these two qualities; a 
faculty of considering what happens to 
each individual, and a grateful dispo- 
sition. Without the first he will not 
perceive the usefulness of things which 
happen, and without the other he will 
not be thankful for them. 

Each of the animals is constituted 
either for food, or husbandry, or to pro- 
duce milk, or some other like use; and 
for these purposes what need is there 
to understand the appearances of things, 
25 



#4 Discourses of Epictetus 

and have the ability to make distinctions 
concerning them? But God hath intro- 
duced man as a spectator of himself and 
his works, and not only as a spectator, 
but as an interpreter of them as well. 
It is therefore shameful that man should 
begin and end where irrational creatures 
do. He is indeed rather to begin there, 
but to end where nature itself hath fixed 
our end, — in contemplation and under- 
standing, and in a scheme^oi life con- 
formable to nature. 

Take care, then, not to die without 
being spectators of these things. You 
take a journey to Olympia to behold 
the work of Phidias, and each of you 
thinks it a misfortune to die without a 
knowledge of such things; but will you 
have no inclination to understand and 
be spectators of those works which are 
26 



Discourses of Epictetus ?# 

ready and at hand, even to those who 
bestow no pains and for which there is 
no need to take a journey? Will you 
never perceive, either what you are or for 
what you were born ; nor for what pur- 
pose you are admitted spectators of this 
sight ? 

But there are some things unpleasant 
and difficult in life. 

And are there none at Olympia? Are 
you not heated ? Are you not crowded ? 
Are you not without good conveniences 
for bathing? Are you not wet through 
when it happens to rain? Are you not 
obliged to tolerate uproar and noise and 
other disagreeable circumstances? But, 
I suppose, by comparing all these with 
the advantage of seeing so valuable a 
sight, you support and go through them. 
Well, and have you not received facul- 
27 



#4 Discourses of Epictetus 

ties by which you may support every 
event in life? Have you not received a 
manly spirit? Have you not received 
patience ? What signifies to me anything 
that happens, while I have greatness of 
soul? What shall disconcert or trouble 
or appear grievous to me? Shall I not 
make use of my faculties, for the pur- 
pose they were granted me, in place of 
lamenting and groaning at^jyhatjbap- 
pens? 

Pray, what figure do you think Her- 
cules would have made if there had 
not been the lion, and hydra, and stag, 
and unjust and brutal men to expel 
and clear away? And what would he 
have done if none of these had existed? 
Is it not plain that he would have 
wrapped himself up and slept? In the 
first place, then, he would never have 
28 



Discourses of Epictetus 



t=rT 



become a Hercules by dreaming away 
his whole life in such delicacy and ease; 
or if he had been one, what good would 
it have done? What would have been 
the use of his arm, and the rest of his 
strength, of his patience, and greatness 
of mind, if circumstances and events 
had not roused and incited him ? 

What then, must we provide these 
things for ourselves, and introduce a 
boar, and a lion, and a hydra, into our 
country ? 

This would be madness and folly. 
But as they were in being, and to be 
met with, they were proper subjects 
to set off and rouse Hercules. Do you 
therefore likewise, being sensible of this, 
inspect the faculties you have, and, after 
taking a view of them, say, " Bring on 
me now, O Jupiter, what difficulty thou 
29 



#4 Discourses of Epictetus 

wilt, for I have faculties granted me 
by thee, and abilities by which I may 
acquire honour and ornament to my- 
self." — Instead you sit trembling, for 
fear this or that might happen; lament- 
ing, and mourning, and groaning at 
what doth happen; and then you accuse 
the gods. For what is the consequence 
of such a meanspiritedness, but impiety? 
and yet God hath not only granted us 
these faculties, by which we may bear 
every event without being depressed or 
broken by it; but, like a good prince, 
and a true father, hath rendered our 
faculties incapable of restraint, com- 
pulsion, or hindrance, and entirely de- 
pendent on our own pleasure: nor hath 
he reserved a power, even to himself, 
of hindering or restraining them. Hav- 
ing these things free, and your own, 
30 



Discourses of Epictetus H£ 

will you neither make use of them, nor 
consider what you have received, nor 
from whom? but will you sit groan- 
ing and lamenting, some of you blind 
to him who gave them, and not ac- 
knowledging your benefactor; and 
others, basely turning yourselves to 
complaints and accusations of God? I 
will undertake to show you your quali- 
fications and occasions for greatness of 
soul, and a manly spirit, and do you in 
turn show me what occasions you have 
to find fault and complain. (I. vi.) 



3« 



Discourses of Epictetus 



OF OUR KINDRED TO GOD 

Shall kindred to Caesar, or any other 
of the powerful in Rome, enable a man 
to live secure, above contempt, and void 
of all fear whatever; and shall not the 
fact of our having God for our Maker, 
and Father, and Guardian free us from 
griefs and terrors? 

One would think there should be no 
need for an old fellow to sit here con- 
triving how you may avoid thinking 
meanly, and entertaining ignoble notions 
of yourselves; but that rather his busi- 
ness would be, to take care that among 
you there may not happen to be young 
32 



Discourses of Epictetus Hu- 
meri who, realizing their affinity to the 
gods, and that we are fettered by the 
body and its possessions, and the many 
matters necessary for the tasks of life, 
might therefore resolve to throw these 
impediments off, as both troublesome 
and useless, and depart to their kindred 
with God. 

This is the work, if any, that ought 
to employ your master and preceptor, 
if you had one; that you should come 
to him, and say : " Epictetus, we can 
no longer bear being tied down to this 
paltry body, feeding and resting and 
cleaning it, and hurried about with so 
many low cares on its account. Are not 
these things indifferent, and nothing to 
us, and death no evil? Are we not rela- 
tions of God, and did we not come from 
him? Suffer us to go back thither from 
33 



•£H Discourses of Epictetus 

whence we came; suffer us, at length, 
to be delivered from these fetters, that 
chain and weigh us down. Here thieves 
and robbers, and courts of judicature, 
and those who are called tyrants, seem 
to have some power over us, on ac- 
count of the body and its possessions. 
Suffer us to show them, that they have 
no power." 

And in this case it would be my part 
to answer: " My friends, wait for God, 
till he shall give the signal, and dismiss 
you from this service; then return to 
him. For the present, be content to 
remain in this post where he has placed 
you. The time of your abode here is 
short, and easy for such as are disposed 
like you. For what tyrant, what robber, 
what thief, or what courts of judicature 
are formidable to those who thus account 
34 



Discourses of Epictctus H£ 

the body and its possessions as nothing? 
Stay. Depart not inconsiderately." 

Thus ought the case to stand between 
a preceptor and ingenuous young men. 
But how stands it now? The preceptor 
has no life in him, nor have you any. 
When you have been well filled to-day, 
you sit weeping about to-morrow, how 
you shall get food. Why, if you have 
it, wretch, you will have it: if not, you 
will go out of life. The door is open: 
why do you lament? What room doth 
there remain for tears? What occasion 
for flattery? Why should any one 
person envy another? Why should he 
be struck with admiration of those who 
have great possessions, or are placed in 
high rank? Especially if they are power- 
ful and passionate? For what will they 
do to us? The things which they can 
35 



-SH Discourses of Epictetus 

do we do not regard : the things which 
we are concerned about they cannot do. 
Who then, after all, shall command a 
person thus disposed? How was Soc- 
rates affected by these things? As it 
became one who was persuaded of being 
a relation of the gods. "If you should 
tell me (says he to his judges), we will 
acquit you upon condition that you 
shall no longer discourse in the manner 
you have hitherto done, nor make any 
disturbance either among our young or 
our old people; I would answer: 
You are ridiculous in thinking that if 
your general had placed me in any post, 
I ought to maintain and defend it, and 
choose to die a thousand times rather 
than desert it; but if God hath assigned 
me any station or method of life, that 
I ought to desert that for you." (I. ix.) 
36 



Discourses of Epictetus Hr 



OF CONTENTMENT 

True instruction is this: learning to 
be satisfied with things as they happen. 
And how do they happen? As the ap- 
pointer of them hath appointed. He 
hath appointed summer and winter, 
abundance and dearth, virtue and vice, 
and all such contraries, for the harmony 
of the whole. To each of us he hath 
given a body and its parts, and our 
several properties and companions. 
Mindful of this appointment, we should 
enter upon a course of education and in- 
struction not to change the constitutions 
37 



■$H Discourses of Epictetus 

of things, which is neither within our 
power nor for our good; but that, be- 
ing as they are with regard to us, we 
may have our mind accommodated to 
matters as they exist. 

" What, then, must my leg be lame? " 
And is it for one paltry leg, wretch, that 
you accuse the world? Why will you 
not give it up to the whole? Why will 
you not withdraw yourself from it? 
Why will you not gladly yield it to him 
who gave it? And will you be angry 
and discontented with the decrees of 
Jupiter, which he, with the Fates who 
spun in his presence the thread of your 
birth, ordained and appointed? Do not 
you know how very small a part you 
are of the whole? That is, as to body; 
for as to reason you are neither worse, 
nor less, than the gods. For_reason is 
38 



Discourses of Epictetus H£ 

not measured by length or height, but 
by principles. Will you not therefore 
place your good there, where you are 
equal to the gods? (I. xii.) 



39 



^ Discourses of Epictetus 



OF OUR GUARDIAN 

Jupiter has assigned to each man a 
director, his own good genius, and com- 
mitted him to his guardianship; a di- 
rector whose vigilance no slumbers inter- 
rupt, and whom no false reasonings can 
deceive. For to what better and more 
careful guardian could he have com- 
mitted us? So that when you have shut 
your doors, and darkened your room, 
remember never to say that you are 
alone, for you are not; but God is 
within, and your genius is within, and 
what need have they of light to see 
what you are doing? To this God 
40 



Discourses of Epictetus Hr 

you likewise ought to swear such an oath 
as the soldiers do to Caesar. For they, 
in order to receive their pay, swear to 
prefer before all things the safety of 
Caesar, and will not you, who have re- 
ceived so many and so great favours, 
swear, or if you have sworn, will you 
not stand by it? And what must you 
swear? Never to disobey, nor accuse, 
nor murmur at any of the things ap- 
pointed by him, nor unwillingly to do 
or suffer anything necessary. Is this 
oath like the former? In the first, 
persons swear not to honour any other 
beyond Caesar; in the last, beyond all, 
to honour themselves. (I. xiv.) 



4* 



#4 Discourses of Epictetus 



OF OUR DUTY TO GOD 

As soldiers are ready for their com- 
mander, shod, clothed, and armed (for 
it would be a grievous thing for a colo- 
nel to be obliged to go through his 
regiment to put on their shoes and 
clothes), so nature likewise has formed 
the animals made for service, ready pro- 
vided, and standing in need of no further 
care. Thus one little boy, with only a 
crook, drives a flock. 

But now we, instead of being thank- 
ful for this, complain of God that there 
is not the same kind of care taken of 
us likewise. And yet, good heaven ! any 
one thing in the creation is sufficient to 
42 



Discourses of Epictetus 



?^ 



demonstrate a providence to a modest 
and grateful mind. Not to instance at 
present in great things, but only in the 
very production of milk from grass, 
cheese from milk, and wool from skins: 
who formed and contrived these things? 
No one, say you. O surprising stu- 
pidity, and want of shame! 

If we had any understanding, ought 
we not both, in public and in private, 
incessantly sing hymns, and speak well 
of the Deity, and rehearse his benefits? 
Ought we not, whether we are digging, 
or ploughing, or eating, sing the hymn 
to God? Great is God, who has sup- 
plied us with these instruments to till 
the ground: great is God, who has 
given us hands, a power of swallowing, 
a stomach: who has given us the power 
of growing insensibly, of breathing in 
43 



■SH Discourses of Epictetus 

our sleep. Even these things we ought 
not only celebrate upon every occasion; 
but make the subject of the greatest and 
most divine hymn, that he has given us 
the faculty of apprehending them, and 
using them in a proper way. Well, 
then : because the most of you are blind 
and insensible, was it not necessary that 
there should be some one to fill this sta- 
tion, and give out, for all men, the hymn 
to God? For what else can I, a lame 
old man, do but sing hymns to God? If 
I was a nightingale, I would act the part 
of a nightingale: if a swan, the part of 
a swan. But, since I am a rational 
creature, it is my duty to praise God. 
This is my business. I do it. Nor will 
I ever desert this post as long as it is 
granted me; and I exhort you to join 
in the same song. (I. xvi.) 
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Discourses of Epictetus 



OF BEHAVIOUR TOWARD TYRANTS 

The tyrant will chain — what ? — 
A leg. — He will take away — what? 

— A head. — What is there, then, that 
he can neither chain nor take away ? — 
Your will and choice. Hence the advice 
of the ancients — Know thyself. 

What ought to be done, then? 

Drill yourself, for heaven's sake, in 
little things; and from them proceed to 
greater. " I have a pain in my head." 

— Do not cry, Alas ! — "I have a pain 
in my ear." — Do not cry, Alas ! I do 
not say you may not groan, but do not 
groan inwardly. If your servant is a 

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long while in bringing you something 
to bind your head, do not bawl and 
distort yourself, and say, " Everybody 
hates me." For who would not hate 
such a one? 

Rely for the future on these principles, 
walk upright and free; do not trust 
merely to bulk of body like a wrestler: 
for one should not be unconquerable in 
the sense that an ass is stubborn and 
unconquerable. 

Who then is unconquerable? He 
whom the inevitable cannot disturb. 

And again, when the tyrant says to any 
one: " I will chain your leg ": he who 
values his leg, cries out for pity: while 
he who sets the value on his own will 
and choice, says: "If you imagine it 
for your interest, chain it." — "What! 
do not you care? " — No ; I do not care. 
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Discourses of Epictetus £# 

— "I will show you that I am master." 

— You ? How should you ? Jupiter 
has set me free. What ! do you think he 
would suffer his own son to be enslaved ? 
You are master of my body. Take it. 
(I. xviii.—xix.) 



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HOW WE ARE TO STRUGGLE WITH 
DIFFICULTIES 

Difficulties are the things that show 
what men are. For the future, on any 
difficulty, remember that God, like an 
instructor of athletics, has engaged you 
with a rough antagonist. 

For what end? 

That you may be a conqueror like one 
in the Olympic games, and it cannot 
be without toil. No man, in my opinion, 
has a more advantageous difficulty on 
his hands than you have; provided you 
will but use it as an athletic champion 
doth his antagonist. We are now send- 
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Discourses of Epictetus H£ 

ing a spy to Rome; but no one ever 
sends a timorous spy, who, when he only 
hears a noise or sees a shadow, runs back, 
frightened out of his wits, and says: 
" The enemy is just at hand." So now, 
if you should come and tell us : " Things 
are in a fearful way at Rome, death is 
terrible; banishment, terrible; calumny, 
terrible; poverty, terrible; run, good 
people, the enemy is at head " : we will 
answer: Get you gone, and prophesy 
for yourself; our only fault is that we 
have sent such a spy. Diogenes was 
sent a spy before you ; but he told us 
other tidings. He says that death is no 
evil, for it is nothing base ; that defama- 
tion is only the noise of madmen. And 
what account did this spy give us of 
pain? Of pleasure? Of poverty? He 
says that to be naked is better than a 
49 



£H Discourses of Epictetus 

purple robe, to sleep upon the bare 
ground the softest bed, and gives a 
proof of all he says by his own courage, 
tranquillity, and freedom; and, more- 
over, by a healthy and robust body. 
There is no enemy near, says he. All 
is profound peace. — How so, Diogenes ? 
Look upon me, says he. Am I hurt? 
Am I wounded ? Have I run away from 
any one ? This is such a spy as he ought 
to be. But you come and tell us one 
thing after another. Go back again and 
examine things more exactly and with- 
out fear. 

What shall I do, then? 

What do you do when you come out 
of a ship? Do you take the rudder or 
the oars along with you ? What do you 
take, then ? Your own, your bottle, and 
your bundle. So, in the present case, 
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Discourses of Epictetus He 

if you will but remember what is your 
own, you will not claim what belongs to 
others. Are you bid to put off your 
consular robe ? — Well, I am in my 
equestrian. Put off that too. — I have 
only my coat. Put off that too. — Well, 
I am naked. Still you raise my envy. — 
Then e'en take my whole body. If I can 
throw off a paltry body, am I any longer 
afraid of a tyrant? 

But such a one will not leave me his 
heir. What, then, have I forgot that 
none of these things are mine? How, 
then, do we call them mine? As a bed 
in an inn. If the landlord when he dies 
leaves you the beds, well and good ; but, 
if to another, they will be his, and you 
will seek one elsewhere; and conse- 
quently, if you do not find one, you will 
sleep upon the ground ; only keep quiet 
5 1 



#=: Discourses of Epictetus 

and snore soundly, and remember that 
tragedies have no other subjects but the 
rich, and kings, and tyrants. No poor 
man fills any other place in one than 
as part of the chorus: whereas kings 
begin, indeed, with prosperity. " Crown 
the palace with festive garlands." — ■ 
But, then, about the third or fourth 
act : " Alas, Cithaeron ! why didst thou 
receive me?" Where are thy crowns, 
wretch: where is thy diadem? Cannot 
thy guards help thee? 

Whenever you approach any of these, 
then, remember that you meet a tragic 
player; or, rather, not an actor, but 
CEdipus himself. — But such a one is 
happy. He walks with a numerous train. 
Well: I join myself with the crowd, 
and I too walk with a numerous train. 

But remember the principal thing: 
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Discourses of Epictetus H3- 

that the door of life is open. Do not 
be more fearful than children; but as 
they, when the play doth not please 
them, say, " I will play no longer " : so 
do you, in the same case, say, " I will 
play no longer," and go; but, if you 
stay, do not complain. 

But direct me. 

Why should I direct you? Hath not 
Jupiter directed you? Hath he not 
given you what is your own, incapable 
of restraint or hindrance; and what is 
not your own, liable to both? What 
directions, then, what orders have you 
brought from him? " By all methods 
keep what is your own: what belongs 
to others do not covet. Honesty is your 
own; a sense of virtuous shame is your 
own. Who, then, can deprive you of 
these? Who but yourself can restrain 
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#$ Discourses of Epictetus 



you from making use of them? And 
how do you do it ? When you make that 
your concern which is not your own, you 
lose what is." Having such precepts 
and directions from Jupiter, what sort 
do you still want from me? Am I 
better than he? More worthy of credit? 
If you observe these, what others do you 
need? 

Demetrius said to Nero : " You sen- 
tence me to death; and nature, you! " 
If I place my admiration on body, I 
give myself up for a slave; if on an 
estate, the same; for I immediately be- 
tray how I may be taken. Just as when 
a snake pulls in his head, I say, strike 
that part of him which he guards: and 
be you assured, that whatever you show 



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^r 



a desire to guard, there your master 
will attack you. Remembering this, 
whom will you any longer flatter or 
fear? (I. xxiv.—xxv.) 



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OF THE FEAR OF DEATH 

You hear the ignorant say, " Such a 
one, poor soul ! is dead." — Why, his 
father died; his mother died. "Ay; 
but he was cut off in the flower of his 
age, and in a foreign land." — Hear 
these ways of speaking: and avoid such 
expressions. Oppose to one custom a 
contrary custom; to sophistry the art 
of reasoning, and the frequent use and 
exercise of it. When death appears as 
an evil, we ought immediately remem- 
ber that evils may be avoided, but death 
is a necessity. For what can I do, or 
where can I fly from it? 
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Discourses of Epictetus Hr 

Where shall I fly from death? Show 
me the place; show me the people 
whom I may seek, whom death doth 
not overtake. Show me the charm to 
avoid it. If there be none, what would 
you have me do ? I cannot escape death ; 
but cannot I escape the dread of it? 
Must I die trembling and lamenting? 
For the origin of unhappiness and dis- 
content is wishing for something that is 
not obtained. In consequence of this, 
if I can bring over the inevitable to my 
own inclination, I do it; if not, I want 
to tear out the eyes of whoever hinders 
me. For it is the nature of man not 
to bear being deprived of good, nor 
falling into evil. And so, at last, when 
I can neither bring over things to my 
own inclination, nor tear out the eyes 
of him who hinders me, I sit down and 
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#4 Discourses of Epictetus 

groan, and revile him whom I can; 
Jupiter, and the rest of the gods. For 
what are they to me if they take no care 
of me? 

Oh! but you will be guilty of im- 
piety. 

What then? Can I be in a worse 
condition than I am now? In general, 
remember this, that, unless piety and 
interest be placed in the same thing, 
piety cannot be preserved in any mortal 
breast. (I. xxvii.) 



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?^T 



THAT WE ARE NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH 
MANKIND 

Why do not you rather, as we pity 
the blind and lame, so likewise pity those 
who are blinded and lamed in their 
superior faculties? Whoever, therefore, 
duly remembers that the appearance of 
things to the mind is the standard of 
every action to man : that this appear- 
ance is either right or wrong, — i. e., 
if right, he is without fault, if wrong, 
he himself bears the punishment, — for 
one man cannot be the person deceived, 
and another the sufferer ; — whoever re- 
members this will not be vexed and 
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angry at any one; will not revile, or 
reproach, or hate, or quarrel with any 
one. 

Where, then, is the great good or 
evil of man? 

Where his difference is. If neither 
honour, fidelity, or judgment is des- 
troyed, then he himself is preserved like- 
wise; but when any of these is lost and 
demolished, he himself is lost also. In 
this do all great events consist. Paris, 
they say, was undone, because the Greeks 
invaded Troy and laid it waste, and his 
family were slain in battle. By no 
means ; for no one is undone by an action 
not his own. All that was only laying 
waste the nests of storks. But his true 
undoing was when he lost the modest, 
the faithful, the hospitable, and the 
decent character. When was Achilles 
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undone? When Patroclus died? By 
no means. But when he gave himself 
up to rage; when he wept over a girl; 
when he forgot that he came there not 
to get mistresses, but to fight. When 
right principles are ruined, when they 
are destroyed, then is the human un- 
doing, the siege, and overthrow of the 
man. (I. xxviii.) 



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OF INTREPIDITY 

He who hath the power hath given 
sentence. " I judge you to be impious 
and profane." What hath befallen 
you? — I have been judged impious and 
profane. Anything else ? — Nothing. 
Suppose he had passed his judgment 
upon an hypothetical proposition, and 
pronounced it to be a false conclusion, 
that if it be day it is light; what would 
have befallen the proposition? In this 
case who is judged; who condemned; 
the proposition, or he who is deceived 
concerning it? Doth he, who hath the 
power of pronouncing anything concern- 
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Discourses of Epictetus H£ 

ing you, know what pious or impious 
mean? Hath he made it his study, or 
learned it? Where? From whom? 
A musician would not regard him if he 
pronounced bass to be treble: nor a 
mathematician, if he passed sentence that 
lines drawn from the centre to the circle 
are not equal. And shall he, who is 
truly learned, regard an unlearned man, 
when he pronounces upon pious and. 
impious, just and unjust? 

Not man, but death, life, pleasure, 
and pain are the masters of man: for 
without these, bring Caesar to me, and 
you will see how intrepid I shall be. 
But, if he comes with thunder and light- 
ning; and these are the objects of my 
terror; what do I else but, like the run- 
away slave, acknowledge my master? 
While I have any respite from these, I 
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Discourses of Epictetus 



bathe, drink, and sing; but all, with 
terror and anxiety. But, if I free my- 
self from my masters, that is, from such 
things as render a master terrible, what 
trouble, what master have I remaining? 
(I. xxix.) 



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BOOK II. 



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Discourses of Epictetus 



OF COURAGE AND CAUTION 

F~\ EATH ought to be opposed by 
courage, and the fear of death by 
caution: whereas we, on the contrary, 
oppose to death, flight; and to our prin- 
ciple concerning death, carelessness, des- 
perateness and indifference. 

Socrates used very properly to call 
these things tragic masks: for, as masks 
appear shocking and formidable to chil- 
dren, from their inexperience, we are 
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affected in like manner, with regard to 
things, for no other reason than as chil- 
dren are with regard to masks. For 
what is a child? Ignorance. What is 
a child? Want of learning; for, so 
far as the knowledge of children extends, 
they are not inferior to us. What is 
death? A tragic mask. Turn it, and 
be convinced. See, it doth not bite. 
This little body and spirit must be 
separated, as they formerly were, either 
now, or hereafter: why, then, are you 
displeased if it be now? For if not 
now, it will be hereafter. Why? To 
complete the revolution of the world: 
for that hath need of some things present, 
others to come, and others already com- 
pleted. What is pain ? A mask. Turn 
it, and be convinced. 

This paltry flesh is sometimes affected 
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Discourses of Epictetus Hr 

by harsh, sometimes by smooth impres- 
sions. If suffering be not worth your 
while, the door is open; if it be, bear 
it : for it was fit the door should be open 
against all accidents. And thus we have 
no trouble. 

Pray, see how I compose dialogues. 
Talk not of that, man; but rather be 
able to say: See how I avoid the un- 
desirable, and how I achieve the de- 
sirable matters of life. Before me set 
death, pain, prison, ignominy, condem- 
nation, and you will know me. This 
is the proper ostentation of a young man 
come out from the schools. Leave the 
rest to others. Let no one ever hear 
you utter a word about them, nor suffer 
it, if any one commends you for them: 
but think that you are nobody, and 
that you know nothing. Appear to 
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know only this, how you may achieve 
the desirable and avoid the undesirable 
matters of life. Let others study causes, 
problems, and syllogisms. Do you study 
death, chains, torture, exile: and all 
these with courage, and reliance upon 
him who hath called you to them, and 
judged you worthy a post in which you 
may show what the rational governing 
faculty can do when set in array against 
the inevitable. And thus, this paradox 
becomes neither impossible nor a para- 
dox, that we must be at once cautious 
and courageous: courageous in the in- 
evitable, and cautious in matters under 
our own control. (II. i.) 



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OF TRANQUILLITY 

If you wish to be a man of honour 
and fidelity, who shall prevent you? If 
you wish not to be restrained or com- 
pelled, who shall compel you to desires 
contrary to your principles, or to aver- 
sions contrary to your opinion? The 
judge, perhaps, will pass a sentence 
against you which he thinks formidable: 
but how can he likewise make you re- 
ceive it with aversion? Since, then, 
desire and aversion are in your own 
power, what have you else to care for? 
Let this be your introduction, this your 
narration, this your proof, this your 
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#1 Discourses of Epictetus 

victory, this your conclusion, and this 
your applause. Thus Socrates, to one 
who reminded him to prepare for trial: 
" Do not you think," says he, " that I 
have been preparing myself for this very 
thing my whole life?" By what kind 
of preparation ? "I have preserved 
what was in my own power." What 
do you mean? "I have done nothing 
unjust, either in public or in private 
life." 

But if you wish to preserve externals, 
too; your paltry body, your estate or 
dignity; I advise you immediately to 
prepare yourself by every possible prepa- 
ration, and besides, consider the dispo- 
sition of your judge, and of your ad- 
versary. If it be necessary to fall down 
at his feet, fall down at his feet: if to 
weep, weep: if to groan, groan. For 
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when you have subjected what is in 
your own power to externals, submit to 
slavery at once, and do not struggle, and 
at one time be willing to be a slave, and 
at another not willing: but simply, and 
with your whole intention, be one or the 
other; free or a slave, well educated or 
not; a game-cock or a craven: either 
bear to be beat till you die, or give out 
at once; and do not be soundly beat 
first, and then give out at last. If both 
these be shameful, make the distinction 
immediately. (II. ii.) 



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HOW MAGNANIMITY MAY BE CONSIST- 
ENT WITH CARE 

How, then, shall one preserve firm- 
ness and tranquillity of mind; and at 
the same time be careful, and neither 
rash nor negligent? 

By imitating those who play at tables. 
The dice are inanimate; the pieces are 
incapable of sense. How do I know 
what will fall out? But it is my busi- 
ness to manage carefully and dexter- 
ously whatever doth fall out. Thus in 
life, too, this is the chief business; dis- 
tinguish and separate things, and say, 
" Externals are not in my power, but 
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Discourses of Epictetus ?# 

my will and choice are. Where shall 
I seek good and evil ? Within ; in what 
is my own." But in what belongs to 
others, call nothing good, or evil, or 
profit, or hurt, or anything of that sort. 

What, then, are we to treat these in 
a careless way? 

By no means; for this, on the other 
hand, is an evil exercise of the faculty 
of choice; and, therefore, against nature. 
But we are to act with care, because the 
use of the materials is not inanimate; 
and at the same time with firmness and 
tranquillity of mind, because the mate- 
rials themselves are incapable of sense. 

It is difficult, I own, to blend and 
unite the carefulness of one who is af- 
fected by the materials of action, and 
the firmness of one who disregards 
them, but it is not impossible: if it be, 
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it is impossible to be happy. How do 
we act in a voyage? What is in my 
power? To choose the pilot, the sailors, 
the day, the time of day. Afterward 
comes a storm. What have I to care 
for? My part is performed. The sub- 
ject belongs to another, to the pilot. But 
the ship is sinking: what then have I 
to do? That which alone I can do; 
I am drowned, without fear, without 
clamour, or accusing God, and as one 
who knows that what is born must like- 
wise die. For I am not eternity, but 
a man ; a part of the whole, as an hour 
is of the day. I must come like an 
hour, and like an hour must pass away. 
What signifies it whether by drowning 
or by a fever? For, in some way or 
other, pass I must. 

This you may see to be the practice 
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Discourses of Epictetus Hr 

of those who play skilfully at ball. No 
one contends for the ball, as either a 
good or an evil ; but how he may throw 
and catch it again. 

Thus we should be careful how we 
play, but indifferent as to the ball it- 
self. We are by all means to manage 
external materials with dexterity; not 
taking them for ourselves, but showing 
our skill about them, whatever they may 
happen to be. Thus a weaver doth not 
make the wool, but employs his skill 
upon what is given him. It is another 
who gives you food, and property; and 
may take them away, and your paltry 
body too. Do you, however, work 
upon the materials you have received ; 
and then, if you come off unhurt, others, 
no doubt, who meet you, will congratu- 
late you on your escape. But he who 
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hath a clearer insight into such things, 
if he sees you have behaved in a becom- 
ing manner, will praise and congratulate 
you ; but, if you owe your escape to 
any unbecoming action, the contrary. 
For where there is a reasonable cause 
of rejoicing, there is likewise a reason- 
able cause of congratulation. (II. v.) 



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WHEREIN CONSISTS THE ESSENCE OF 
GOD 

You are a distinct portion of the es- 
sence of God, and contain a certain part 
of him in yourself. Why, then, are 
you so ignorant of your noble birth? 
Why do not you consider whence you 
came? Why do not you remember, 
when you are eating, who you are who 
eat, and whom you feed ? When you are 
in the company of women, when you are 
conversing, when you are exercising, 
when you are disputing, do not you 
know that it is a god you feed, a god 
you exercise? You carry a god about 
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#4 Discourses of Epictetus 

with you, wretch, and know nothing 
of it. Do you suppose I mean some 
god without you, of gold or silver? It 
is within yourself you carry him, and 
profane him, without being sensible of 
it, by impure thoughts and unclean 
actions. If even the image of God were 
present, you would not dare to act as 
you do; and when God himself is 
within you, and hears and sees all, are 
not you ashamed to think and act thus, 
insensible of your own nature and hate- 
ful to God? 

Have you not God? Do you seek 
any other, while you have him? If you 
were a statue of Phidias, either Jupiter 
or Minerva, you would remember both 
yourself and the artist; and, if you 
had any sense, you would endeavour to 
do nothing unworthy of him who formed 
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Discourses of Epictetus £# 

you, or of yourself: nor to appear in an 
unbecoming manner to spectators. And 
are you now careless how you appear, 
because you are the workmanship of 
Jupiter? And yet, what comparison is 
there, either between the artists or the 
things they have formed? What work 
of any artist contains in itself those facul- 
ties which are shown in forming it? Is 
it anything but marble, or brass, or gold, 
or ivory? And the Minerva of Phidias, 
when its hand is once extended and a 
Victory placed in it, remains in that 
attitude for ever. But the works of 
God are endued with motion, breath, 
the powers of appreciation and judg- 
ment. Being, then, the formation of 
such an artist, will you dishonour him, 
especially when he hath not only formed, 
but intrusted and given the guardian- 
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ship of you to yourself? Will you not 
only be forgetful of this, but, moreover, 
dishonour the trust? If God had com- 
mitted some orphan to your charge, 
would you have been thus careless of 
him? He hath delivered yourself to 
your care, and says, " I had no one fitter 
to be trusted than you: preserve this 
person for me, such as he is by nature; 
modest, faithful, sublime, unterrified, 
dispassionate, tranquil." And will you 
not preserve him? (II. viii.) 



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OF THE CHARACTER OF MAN 

It is no common attainment merely 
to fulfil what the nature of man prom- 
ises. For what is man? 

A rational and mortal being. 

Well: from what are we distin- 
guished by reason? 

From wild beasts. 

From what else? 

From sheep and the like. 

Take care, then, to do nothing like 
a wild beast; otherwise you have des- 
troyed the man; you have not fulfilled 
what your nature promises. Take care, 
too, to do nothing like cattle; for thus 
likewise the man is destroyed. 
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In what do we act like cattle? 

When we act gluttonously, lewdly, 
rashly, sordidly, inconsiderately, into 
what are we sunk? 

Into cattle. 

What have we destroyed? 

The rational being. 

When we behave contentiously, inju- 
riously, passionately, and violently, into 
what are we sunk? 

Into wild beasts. 

And further: some of us are wild 
beasts of a larger size ; others, little mis- 
chievous vermin; whence there is room 
to say, Let me rather be devoured by 
a lion. By all these means is destroyed 
what the nature of man promises. 

When is a flute, a harp, a horse, or a 
dog preserved? 



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When each fulfils what its nature 
promises. 

Where is the wonder, then, that man 
should be preserved and destroyed in 
the same manner? All are preserved 
and improved by operations correspond- 
ent to their several faculties; as a car- 
penter, by building; a grammarian, by 
grammar; but if he accustom himself 
to write ungrammatically, his art will 
necessarily be spoiled and destroyed. 
Thus modest actions preserve the modest 
man, and immodest ones destroy him; 
and, in turn, faithful actions preserve 
the faithful man, and contrary actions 
destroy him. On the other hand, con- 
trary actions heighten contrary charac- 
ters. Thus impudence, an impudent 
one; knavery, a knavish one; slander, 



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a slanderous one; anger, an angry one; 
and unequitable dealings, a covetous one. 
Consider, then, from what you are 
distinguished by reason. You are dis- 
tinguished from wild beasts: you are 
distinguished from cattle. Besides, you 
are a citizen of the world, and a part 
of it; not a subservient, but a principal 
part. You are capable of comprehending 
the divine economy; and of considering 
the connections of things. What then 
doth the character of a citizen promise? 
To hold no private interest; to deliber- 
ate of nothing as a separate individual, 
but like the hand or the foot, which, 
if they had reason, and comprehended 
the constitution of nature, would never 
pursue, or desire, but with a reference 
to the whole. Hence the philosophers 
rightly say, that, if a wise and good man 
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Discourses of Epictetus H£ 

could foresee what was to happen, he 
would help forward sickness and death, 
and mutilation, to himself; being sensi- 
ble that these things are appointed from 
the order of the universe, and that the 
whole is superior to a part, and the city 
to the citizen. But, since we do not 
foreknow what is to happen, it becomes 
our duty to adhere to what is more 
naturally adapted to our option: for, 
amongst other things, we were born for 
this. 

Remember, next, that you are a son; 
and what doth this character promise? 
To esteem everything that is his, as be- 
longing to his father: in every instance 
to obey him: not to revile him to an- 
other: not to say or do anything inju- 
rious to him: to give way and yield 



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in everything; cooperating with him to 
the utmost of his power. 

After this, know likewise, that you 
are a brother ; and that to this character 
it belongs, to make concessions; to be 
easily persuaded ; to use gentle language ; 
never to claim for yourself any of the 
things dependent on choice, but cheer- 
fully to give these, that you may have the 
larger share of what is dependent on 
it. For, consider what it is, instead of 
a lettuce, for instance, or a chair, to 
procure for yourself a good temper? 
How great an advantage gained! 

If you were to part with your skill 
in grammar, or in music, would you 
think the loss of these a damage? And, 
if you part with honour, decency, and 
gentleness, do you think that no matter? 
Yet the first are lost by some cause ex- 
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^ 



ns 



ternal, and independent on choice; but 
the last by our own fault. There is no 
shame either in having, or losing the 
first; but either not to have, or to lose, 
the other, is equally shameful and re- 
proachful and unhappy. 

Have we not a natural sense of hon- 
our? 

We have. 

Doth he who loses this suffer no dam- 
age? Is he deprived of nothing? Doth 
he part with nothing that belongs to 
him? Have we no natural fidelity? No 
natural affection? No natural dispo- 
sition to mutual usefulness, to mutual 
forbearance? Is he, then, who care- 
lessly suffers himself to be damaged in 
these respects, unhurt and undamaged? 
(II. ix.-x.) 



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OF THE WORK OF A PHILOSOPHER 

We imagine it to be the work of one 
who studies philosophy to adapt his will 
to whatever happens ; so that none of the 
things which happen may happen against 
our inclination, nor those which do not 
happen be wished for by us, Hence, 
they who have settled this point have 
it in their power to achieve the desirable 
and avoid the undesirable matters of 
life; and to lead a life exempt from sor- 
row, fear, and perturbation in them- 
selves; and in society preserving all the 
natural and adventitious relations of a 
son, a father, a brother, a citizen, a 
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husband, a wife, a neighbour, a fellow 
traveller, a ruler, or a subject. Some- 
thing like this is what we imagine to 
be the work of a philosopher. It re- 
mains to inquire how it is to be effected. 
Now we see that a carpenter by learning 
certain things becomes a carpenter; and 
a pilot by learning certain things becomes 
a pilot. Probably, then, it is not suffi- 
cient, in the present case, merely to be 
willing to be wise and good; but it is 
moreover necessary that certain things 
should be learned. What these things 
are is the question. The philosophers 
say that we are first to learn that there 
is a God, and that his Providence di- 
rects the whole ; and that it is impossible 
to conceal from him, not only our ac- 
tions, but even our thoughts and emo- 
tions. We are next to learn what the 
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Gods are: for such as they are found 
to be, such must he, who would please 
and obey them to the utmost of his 
power, endeavour to be. If the deity 
is faithful, he, too, must be faithful; if 
free, beneficent, and exalted, he must be 
free, beneficent, and exalted likewise; 
and, in all his words and actions, behave 
as an imitator of God. 

In a crowded fair the horses and cattle 
are brought to be sold, and the greatest 
part of men come either to buy or sell; 
but there are a few who come only to 
look at the fair, and inquire how it is 
carried on; and why in that manner; 
and who appointed it; and for what 
purpose: thus, in the fair of the world, 
some, like cattle, trouble themselves 
about nothing but fodder. For as to 
all you who busy yourselves about pos- 
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sessions and farms and domestics and 
public posts, these things are nothing 
else but mere fodder. But there are 
some few men among the crowd who 
are fond of looking on and considering, 
" What then, after all, is the world ? 
Who governs it? Hath it no governor? 
How is it possible, when neither a city 
nor a house can remain ever so short 
a time without some one to govern and 
take care of it, that this vast and beauti- 
ful system should be administered in a 
fortuitous and disorderly manner? Is 
there then a governor? What sort of 
one is he? And how doth he govern; 
and what are we who are under him? 
And for what designed ? Have we some 
connection and relation to him ; or 
none?" In this manner are the few 
affected; and apply themselves only to 
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view the fair and then depart. Well: 
and are they laughed at by the multi- 
tude? Why, so are the lookers-on by 
the buyers and sellers; and, if the cattle 
had any apprehension, they, too, would 
laugh at such as admired anything but 
fodder. (II. xiv.) 



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OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING GOOD AND 
EVIL 

We always represent things greater 
than the reality. In a voyage, for in- 
stance, casting my eyes down upon the 
ocean below, and looking round me 
and seeing no land, I am out of my wits, 
and imagine that if I should be ship- 
wrecked I must swallow all that ocean; 
nor doth it once enter my head, that 
three pints are enough to do my business. 
What is it then that alarms me? The 
ocean? No, but my own principle. 
Again, in an earthquake, I imagine the 
city is going to fall upon me; but is 
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not one little stone enough to knock 
my brains out? What is it then that 
oppresses and puts us out of our wits? 
Why, what else but our principles? 
For what is it but mere principle that 
oppresses him who leaves his country, 
and is separated from his acquaintance, 
and friends, and place, and usual man- 
ner of life? 

See the origin of tragedy when trifling 
accidents befall foolish men. " Ah, 
when shall I see Athens and the citadel 
again ! " Wretch, are not you contented 
with what you see every day? Can you 
see anything better than the sun, the 
moon, the stars, the whole earth, the 
sea? But if, besides, you comprehend 
him who administers the whole, and 
carry him about in yourself, do you 
still long after pebbles and a fine rock? 
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What will you do, then, when you are 
to leave even the sun and moon? Will 
you sit crying like an infant? 

Boldly make a desperate push, man, 
as the saying is, for prosperity, for 
freedom, for magnanimity. Lift up your 
head at last, as free from slavery. Dare 
to look up to God and say, " Make use 
of me for the future as thou wilt. I am 
of the same mind ; I am equal with thee. 
I refuse nothing which seems good to 
thee. Lead me whither thou wilt. 
Clothe me in whatever dress thou wilt. 
Is it thy will, that I should be in a 
public or a private condition, dwell here 
or be banished, be poor or rich? Under 
all these circumstances I will make thy 
defence to men. I will show what the 
nature of everything is." No. Rather 
sit alone in a warm place, and wait till 
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your mamma comes to feed you. If 
Hercules had sat loitering at home, what 
would he have been? Eurystheus, and 
not Hercules. Besides, by travelling 
through the world, how many acquaint- 
ance and how many friends had he? 
But none more his friend than God, for 
which reason he was believed to be the 
son of God, and was so. In obedience 
to him, he went about extirpating in- 
justice and lawless force. But you are 
not Hercules, nor able to extirpate the 
evils of others; nor even Theseus to 
extirpate the evils of Attica. Extirpate 
your own, then. Expel, instead of Pro- 
crustes and Sciron, grief, fear, desire, 
envy, malevolence, avarice, effeminacy, 
intemperance, from your mind. But 
these can be no otherwise expelled than 
by looking up to God alone as your 
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pattern; by attaching yourself to him 
alone, and being consecrated to his com- 
mands. If you wish for anything else, 
you will, with sighs and groans, follow 
what is stronger than you, always seek- 
ing prosperity without, and never able 
to find it. For you seek it where it is 
not, and neglect to seek it where it is 
(II. xvi.) 



LofC. 



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OF THE WILL OF GOD 

Have no will but the will of God; 
and who shall restrain you, who shall 
compel you any more than Jupiter? 
When you have such a guide, and con- 
form your will and inclinations to his, 
what need you fear being disappointed? 
Yield up your desire and aversion to 
riches, or poverty; the one will be dis- 
appointed, the other incurred. Yield 
them up to health, power, honours, your 
country, friends, children, in short, to 
anything independent on choice, you will 
be unfortunate. But yield them up to 
Jupiter and the other gods. Give your- 



Discourses of Epictetus H£ 



self up to these; let these govern, let 
both be ranged on the same side with 
these; and how can you be any longer 
unprosperous ? But if, poor wretch, you 
envy, and pity, and are jealous, and trem- 
ble, and never cease a single day from 
complaining of yourself and the Gods, 
why do you boast of your education?; 
What education, man ? That you have I 
learned convertible syllogisms? Why 
do not you, if possible, unlearn all these \ 
and begin again, convinced that hitherto 
you have not even touched upon the / 
point? And, for the future, beginning 
from this foundation, proceed in order, 
to the superstructure, that nothing may 
happen which you do not wish, and that 
everything may happen which you do. 
Give me but one young man who brings 
this intention with him to the school, 

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#£ Discourses of Epictetus 

who is a champion for this point, and 
says, " I yield up all the rest: it suffices 
me, if once I become able to pass my 
life, free from hindrance and grief; to 
stretch out my neck to all events, as 
free; and to look up to heaven, as the 
friend of God, fearing nothing that can 
happen." Let any one of you show 
himself of such a disposition, that I may 
say, " Come into the place, young man, 
that is of right your own; for you are 
destined to be an ornament to philosophy. 
Yours are these possessions; yours these 
books; yours these discourses." Then, 
when he hath mastered and got the better 
of this first class, let him come to me 
again, and say, " I desire indeed to be 
free from passion and perturbation; but 
I desire too, as a pious, a philosophic, 
and a carefully attentive man, to know 
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what is my duty to God, to my parents, 
to my relations, to my country, and to 
strangers." " Come into the second 
class too; for this likewise is yours." 
" But I have now sufficiently studied 
the second class too; and I would 
willingly be secure, and unshaken by 
error and delusion, not only awake, but 
even when asleep; when warmed with 
wine; when diseased with the spleen." 
" You are a god, man ; your intentions 
are great." (II. xvii.) 



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OF HABIT 

Every habit and faculty is preserved 
and increased by correspondent actions: 
as the habit of walking, by walking; 
of running, by running. If you would 
be a reader, read; if a writer, write. 
But if you do not read for a month to- 
gether, but do somewhat else, you will 
see what will be the consequence. So, 
after sitting still for ten days, get up 
and attempt to take a long walk, and 
you will find how your legs are weak- 
ened. Upon the whole, then, whatever 
you would make habitual, practise it; 
and, if you would not make a thing 
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?=?r 



habitual, do not practise it, but habituate 
yourself to something else. 

It is the same with regard to the 
operations of the soul. Whenever you 
are angry, be assured that it is not only 
a present evil, but that you have in- 
creased a habit, and added fuel to a fire. 
It is impossible but that habits and 
faculties must either be first produced, 
or strengthened and increased, by corre- 
spondent actions. When you once de- 
sire money, for example, if a degree of 
reasoning sufficient to produce a sense 
of the evil be applied, the desire ceases, 
and the governing faculty of the mind 
regains its authority: whereas, if you 
apply no remedy, it returns no more 
to its former state; but, being again 
excited by a correspondent appearance, 
it kindles at the desire more quickly 
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than before, and, by frequent repetitions, 
at last becomes callous: and by this 
infirmity is the love of money fixed. For 
he who hath had a fever, even after it 
hath left him, is not in the same state 
of health as before, unless he was per- 
fectly cured : and the same thing happens 
in distempers of the soul likewise. 
There are certain traces and blisters 
left in it, which, unless they are well 
effaced, whenever a new hurt is re- 
ceived in the same part, instead of blis- 
ters become sores. 

If you would not be of an angry tem- 
per, then, do not feed the habit. Give 
it nothing to help its increase. Be 
quiet at first, and reckon the days in 
which you have not been angry. I used 
to be angry every day; now every other 
day; then every third and fourth day: 
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and, if you miss it so long as thirty 
days, offer a sacrifice of thanksgiving to 
God. v For habit is first weakened, and 
then entirely destroyed .J (II. xviii.) 



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OF FRIENDSHIP 

Do you not often see little dogs caress- 
ing and playing with each other, that 
you would say nothing could be more 
friendly; but, to learn what this friend- 
ship is, throw a bit of meat between 
them, and you will see. Do you too 
throw a bit of an estate betwixt you 
and your son, and you will see that he 
will quickly wish you underground, and 
you him : and then you, no doubt, on the 
other hand, will exclaim, What a son 
have I brought up! He would bury me 
alive! Throw in a pretty girl, and the 
old fellow and the young one will both 
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fall in love with her; or let fame or 
danger intervene, the words of the father 
of Admetus will be yours: 

"You hold life dear; doth not your father 
too ? " 

Whenever, therefore, any one makes 
his interest to consist in the same thing 
with sanctity, virtue, his country, parents, 
and friends, all these are secured; but 
wherever they are made to interfere, 
friends, and country, and family, and 
justice itself, all give way, borne down 
by the weight of self-interest. For 
wherever / and mine are placed, thither 
must every animal gravitate. If in 
body, that will sway us; if in choice, 
that; if in externals, these. If, there- 
fore, I be placed in a right choice, then 
only I shall be a friend, a son, or a 
father, such as I ought. For in that 
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case it will be for my interest to preserve 
the faithful, the modest, the patient, the 
abstinent, the beneficent character; to 
keep the relations of life inviolate. But, 
if I place myself in one thing, and virtue 
in another, the doctrine of Epicurus will 
stand its ground, That virtue is nothing, 
or mere opinion. (II. xxii.) 



no 



BOOK III. 



in 



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BE PREPARED FOR DEATH 

T""\0 not you know that both sickness 
^"^ and death must overtake us? At 
what employment? The husbandman at 
his plough ; the sailor on his voyage. At 
what employment would you be taken? 
For, indeed, at what employment ought 
you to be taken? If there is any better 
employment at which you can be taken, 
follow that. For my own part, I would 
be taken engaged in nothing, but in the 
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?H Discourses of Epictetus 

care of my own faculty of choice; how 
to render it undisturbed, unrestrained, 
uncompelled, free. I would be found 
studying this, that I may be able to say 
to God, " Have I transgressed thy com- 
mands? Have I perverted the powers, 
the senses, the preconceptions which thou 
hast given me? Have I ever accused 
thee, or censured thy dispensations? I 
have been sick, because it was thy pleas- 
ure; and so have others, but I willingly. 
I have been poor, it being thy will, but 
with joy. I have not been in power, 
because it was not thy will; and power 
I have never desired. Hast thou ever 
seen me out of humour upon this ac- 
count? Have I not always approached 



thee with a 


cheerful 


countenance, 


pre- 


pared to execute 


thy ( 


:ommands and the 


significations 


of 


thy 
114 


will? Is it 


thy 



Discourses of Epictetus Hr 

pleasure that I should depart from this 
assembly? I depart. I give thee all 
thanks that thou hast thought me worthy 
to have a share in it with thee ; to behold 
thy works, and to join with thee in com- 
prehending thy administration." Let 
death overtake me while I am thinking, 
while I am writing, while I am reading 
such things as these. (III. v.) 



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OF CONSTANCY 

You possess many things, you still 
want others; so that, whether you will 
or not, you are poorer than I. 

What, then, do I want? 

What you have not: constancy, a 
mind conformable to nature, and a free- 
dom from perturbation. Patron or no 
patron, what care I? But you do. I 
am richer than you. I am not anx- 
ious what Caesar will think of me. 
I flatter no one on that account. This 
I have, instead of silver and gold plate. 
You have your vessels of gold; but 
mere earthen-ware are your princi- 
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ples, your discourse, your assents, your 
pursuits, your desires. When I have all 
these conformable to nature, why should 
not I bestow some study upon my rea- 
soning too? I am at leisure. My mind 
is under no distraction. In this freedom 
from distraction, what shall I do ? Have 
I anything more becoming a main than 
this? You, when you have nothing to 
do, are restless; you go to the theatre, 
or perhaps to bathe. Why should not 
the philosopher polish his reasoning? 
You have fine crystal and myrrhine 
vases; I have acute forms of reasoning. 
To you, all you have appears little; to 
me, all I have, great. Your appetite is 
unsatiable ; mine is satisfied. When 
children thrust their hand into a narrow 
jar of nuts and figs, if they fill it they 
cannot get it out again; then they fall 
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a-crying. Drop a few of them and you 
will get out the rest. And do you too 
drop your desire; do not covet many 
things, and you will get some. (III. ix.) 



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HOW TO BEAR SICKNESS 

What is it to bear a fever well? To 
blame neither God nor man, nor to be 
afflicted at what happens; to expect 
death in a right and becoming manner, 
and to do what is to be done. When the 
physician enters, do not dread what he 
may say; nor, if he should tell you that 
you are in a fair way, be too much re- 
joiced; for what good hath he told you? 
When you were in health, what good 
did it do you? Be not dejected when 
he tells you that you are very ill; for 
what is it to be very ill? To be near 
the separation of soul and body. What 
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harm is there in this, then? If you are 
not near it now, will you not be near 
it hereafter? What, will the world 
be quite overset when you die? Why, 
then, do you flatter your physician? 
Why do you say, "If you please, sir, I 
shall do well " ? Why do you furnish 
an occasion to his pride? Why do you 
not treat a physician, with regard to 
an insignificant body, which is not yours, 
but by nature mortal, as you do a shoe- 
maker about your feet, or a carpenter 
about a house? These are the things 
necessary to one in a fever. If he fulfils 
these, he hath what belongs to him. 

(III. X.) 



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OF SOLITUDE 

Solitude is the state of a helpless per- 
son. For not he who is alone is there- 
fore solitary, any more than one in a 
crowd has company. When, therefore, 
we lose a son, or a brother, or a friend 
on whom we have been used to repose, 
we often say we are left solitary even 
in the midst of Rome, where such a 
crowd is continually meeting us; where 
we live among so many, and when we 
have, perhaps, a numerous train of serv- 
ants. For he is understood to be soli- 
tary who is helpless and exposed to 
such as would injure him. Hence, in 

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a journey especially, we call ourselves 
solitary when we fall among thieves; 
for it is not the sight of a man that re- 
moves our solitude, but of an honest 
man, a man of honour and a helpful 
companion. If merely being alone is 
sufficient for solitude, Jupiter may be 
said to be solitary at the conflagration, 1 
and bewail himself that he hath neither 
Juno, nor Pallas, nor Apollo, nor 
brother, nor son, nor descendant, nor 
relation. This some indeed say he doth, 
when he is alone at the conflagration. 
Such as these, moved by some natural 
principle, some natural desire of society 
and mutual love, and by the pleasure of 
conversation, do not rightly consider 

1 A doctrine of Heraclitus, afterward adopted 
by the Stoics, " that all things had their origin 
in fire, and were resolved into it." 
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the state of a person who is alone. We 
ought, however, to be prepared in 
some manner for this also, to be self- 
sufficient and able to bear our own 
company. For as Jupiter converses 
with himself, acquiesces in himself, and 
contemplates his own administration, 
and is employed in thoughts worthy of 
himself: so should we too be able to 
talk with ourselves, and not to need 
the conversation of others, nor be at 
a loss for employment; to attend to the 
divine administration; to consider our 
relation to other beings; how we have 
formerly been affected by events, how 
we are affected now; what are the 
things that still press upon us, how 
these too may be cured, how removed ; 
if anything wants completing, to com- 
plete it according to reason. You see 
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that Caesar hath procured us a profound 
peace; there are neither wars nor bat- 
tles, nor great robberies nor piracies, 
but we may travel at all hours, and 
sail from east to west. But can Caesar 
procure us peace from a fever too? 
From a shipwreck? From a fire? From 
an earthquake? From a thunderstorm? 
Nay, even from love? He cannot. 
From grief? From envy? No, not 
from any one of these. But the doctrine 
of philosophers promises to procure^ us 
peace from these too. And what doth 
it say? " If you will attend to me, O 
mortals, wherever you are, and what- 
ever you are doing, you shall neither 
grieve nor be angry, nor be compelled 
nor restrained; but you shall live im- 
passive, and free from all." Shall not 
he who enjoys this peace, proclaimed, 
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not by Cassar (for how should he have 
it to proclaim?) but by God, through 
reason, be contented, when he is alone 
reflecting and considering: "To me 
there can now no ill happen; there is 
no thief, no earthquake. All is full of 
peace, all full of tranquillity; every 
road, every city, every assembly. My 
neighbour, my companion, unable to 
hurt me." Another, whose care it is, 
provides you with food, with clothes, 
with senses, with preconceptions. When- 
ever he doth not provide what is neces- 
sary, he sounds a retreat; he opens the 
door, and says to you, " Come." 
Whither? To nothing dreadful, but 
to that whence you were made ; to what 
is friendly and congenial to the elements. 
What in you was fire, goes away to fire ; 
what was earth, to earth; what air, to 

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air; what water, to water. There is 
no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Cocytus, 
nor Pyriphlegethon ; but all is full of 
gods and daemons. He who can have 
such thoughts, and can look upon the 
sun, moon, and stars, and enjoy the 
earth and sea, is no more solitary than 
he is helpless. — Well, but suppose any 
one should come and murder me, when 
I am alone. — Fool, not you, but that 
insignificant body of yours. 

What solitude is there then left? 
What destitution? Why do we make 
ourselves worse than children? What 
do they do when they are left alone? 
They take up shells and dust; they 
build houses, then pull them down, then 
build something else, and thus never 
want amusement. Suppose you were all 
to sail away, am I to sit and cry because 
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I am left alone and solitary? Am I so 
unprovided with shells and dust? But 
children do this from folly; and we are 
wretched from wisdom. 

Study first how to live like a person 
in sickness, that in time you may know 
how to live like one in health. Abstain 
from food. Drink water. Totally re- 
press your desire, for some time, that 
you may at length use it according to 
reason ; and, if according to reason, as 
you may, when you come to have some 
good in you, you will use it well. No, 
but we would live immediately as men 
already wise, and be of service to man- 
kind. — Of what service? What are 
you doing? Why, have you been of 
service to yourself? But you would 
exhort them. Y'ou exhort! Would you 
be of service to them, show them, by 
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your own example, what kind of men 
philosophy makes, and be not imperti- 
nent,, When you eat, be of service to 
those who eat with you ; when you 
drink, to those who drink with you. Be 
of service to them, by giving way to all, 
yielding to them, bearing with them ; 
and not by throwing out your own ill 
humour upon them. (III. xiii.) 



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OF CONCEIT 

I am better than you, for my father 
hath been consul. I have been a tribune, 
says another, and not you. If we were 
horses, would you say, My father was 
swifter than yours? I have abundance 
of oats and hay, and fine trappings? 
What now, if, while you were saying 
this, I should answer, " Be it so. Let 
us run a race, then." Is there nothing 
in man analogous to a race in horses, 
by which it may be known which is 
better or worse? Is there not honour, 
fidelity, justice? Show yourself the 
better in these, that you may be the 
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better, as a man. But if you tell me you 
can kick violently, I will tell you again 
that you value yourself on the property 
of an ass. (III. xiv.) 



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OF THE POWER OF ACTS, NOT WORDS 

A carpenter doth not come and say, 
" Hear me discourse on the art of 
building " ; but he hires a house and 
fits it up and shows himself master of 
his trade. Let it be your business like- 
wise to do something like this: eat like 
a man; drink, dress, marry, have chil- 
dren, perform the duty of a citizen; 
bear reproach; bear with an unreason- 
able brother; bear with a father; bear 
with a son, a neighbour, a companion, as 
becomes a man. Show us these things 
that we may see that you have really 
learnt somewhat from the philosophers. 
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" No," you say, " but come and hear 
me repeat commentaries." Get you 
gone, and seek somebody else to throw 
them out upon. " Nay, but I will ex- 
plain the doctrines of Chrysippus to 
you, as no other person can; I will 
elucidate his diction in the clearest 
manner." And is it for this, then, that 
young men leave their country and 
their own parents, that they may 
come and hear you explain words? 
Ought they not to return patient, ac- 
tive, free from passion, free from per- 
turbation; furnished with such a pro- 
vision for life that, setting out with 
it, they will be able to bear all events 
well, and derive ornament from them? 
But how should you impart what you 
have not? For have you yourself done 
anything else from the beginning but 
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spent your time in solving syllogisms 
and convertible propositions and inter- 
rogatory arguments ? " But such a one 
hath a school, and why should not I 
have one ? " — Wretch, these things are 
not effected in a careless and fortuitous 
manner. But there must be age and 
a method of life and a guiding God. 
Is it not so? No one quits the port or 
sets sail till he hath sacrificed to the 
gods, and implored their assistance; nor 
do men sow without first invoking Ceres. 
And shall any one who hath under- 
taken so great a work undertake it 
safely without the gods ? And shall they, 
who apply to such a one, apply to him 
with success? What are you doing else, 
man, but divulging the mysteries? And 
you say, " There is a temple at Eleusis, 
and here is one too. There is a priest, 
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•SH Discourses of Epictetus 

and I will make a priest here; there 
is a herald, and I will appoint a herald 
too; there is a torch-bearer, and I will 
have a torch-bearer; there are torches, 
and so shall there be here. The words 
said, the things done are the same. 
Where is the difference betwixt one and 
the other ? " Most impious man ! is 
there no difference? Are these things 
of use out of place, and out of time? A 
man should come with sacrifices and 
prayers, previously purified, and his 
mind affected with a sense that he is 
approaching to sacred and ancient 
rites. 

Thus the mysteries become useful; 
thus we come to have an idea that all 
these things were appointed by the an- 
cients for the instruction and correction 
of life. But you divulge and publish 
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them, without regard to time and place, 
without sacrifices, without purity; you 
have not the garment that is necessary for 
a priest, nor the hair or the girdle that is 
necessary; nor the voice, nor the age; 
nor have you purified yourself like him. 
But, when you have got the w r ords by 
heart, you say, " The words are sacred 
of themselves." These things are to be 
approached in another manner. It is a 
great, it is a mystical affair; not given 
by chance, or to every one indifferently. 
You set up for a physician, provided 
with nothing but medicines, and without 
knowing, or having studied, w T here or 
how they are to be applied. " Why, 
such a one had medicines for the eyes, 
and I have the same." Have you, then, 
a faculty too of making use of them? 
Do you at all know when and how and 
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to whom they will be of service? Why, 
then, do you act at hazard? Why are 
you careless in things of the greatest im- 
portance ? Why do you attempt a mattea* 
unsuitable to you? Leave it to those 
who can perform it, and do it honour. 
Do not you, too, bring a scandal upon 
philosophy by your means, nor be one 
of those who cause the thing itself to be 
calumniated. But, if theorems delight 
you, sit quiet, and turn them every way 
by yourself; but never call yourself a 
philosopher, nor suffer another to call 
you so ; but say, " He is mistaken ; for 
my desires are not different from what 
they were; nor my pursuits directed to 
other objects; nor my assent otherwise 
given ; nor have I at all made any change 
in the use of the appearances, from my 
former condition." Think and speak 
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thus of yourself, if you would think as 
you ought; if not, act at all hazards, 
and do as you do, for it becomes you. 
(III. xxi.) 



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THAT WE SHOULD NOT DESIRE WHAT 
IS BEYOND OUR OWN POWER 

A wise and good man, mindful who 
he is and whence he came, and by whom 
he was produced, is attentive only how 
he may fill his post regularly and duti- 
fully to God. " Is it thy pleasure I 
should any longer continue in being? I 
will continue free, spirited, agreeably to 
thy pleasure; for thou hast made me 
incapable of restraint in what is my own. 
But hast thou no further use for me? 
Fare thou well! I have stayed thus 
long for thy sake alone, and no other, 
and now I depart in obedience to thee." 
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— " How do you depart? " — " Again, 
agreeably to thy pleasure ; as free, as thy 
servant, as one sensible of. thy commands 
and thy prohibitions. But while I am 
employed in thy service, what wouldst 
thou have me be ? A prince or a private 
man, a senator or a plebeian, a soldier or 
a general, a preceptor or the master of a 
family? Whatever post or rank thou 
shalt assign me, like Socrates, I will die 
a thousand times rather than desert it. 
Where wouldst thou have me be? At 
Rome or at Athens, at Thebes or at 
Gyaros? Only remember me there. If 
thou shalt send me where men cannot 
live conformably to nature, I do not 
depart from thence in disobedience to 
thy will, but as receiving my signal of 
retreat from thee. I do not desert thee; 
heaven forbid! but I perceive thou hast 
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no use for me. If a life conformable to 
nature be granted, I will seek no other 
place but that in which I am, nor any 
other company but those with whom I 
am." 

Let these things be ready at hand 
night and day. These things write; 
these things read; of these things talk 
both to yourself and others. \ " Seek not 
good from without ; seek it in yourselves, 
or you will never find itj For this rea- 
son he now brings me hither, now sends 
me thither ; shows me to mankind, poor, 
without authority, sick; sends me to 
Gyaros, leads me to prison : not that he 
hates me ; heaven forbid ! For who hates 
the best of his servants? Nor that he 
neglects me, for he doth not neglect any 
one of the smallest things; but to exer- 
cise me, and make use of me as a wit- 
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ness to others. Appointed to such a 
service, do I still care where I am, or 
with whom, or what is said of me, in- 
stead am I not wholly attentive to God, 
and to his orders and commands? " 

Having these things always at hand, 
and practising them by yourself, and 
making them ready for use, you will 
never want any one to comfort and 
strengthen you. Shame doth not consist 
in having nothing to eat, but in not 
having reason enough to exempt you 
from fear and sorrow. But, if you once 
acquire that exemption, will a tyrant, 
or his guards or courtiers, be anything 
to you ? Will any appointment to offices, 
or they who offer sacrifices in the capitol 
on being admitted into the Emperor's 
train, give uneasiness to you, who have 
received so great a command from Jupi- 
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ter? Only, do not make a parade of it, 
nor grow insolent upon it. But show 
it by your actions; and, though no one 
should perceive it, be content that you 
are well and happy. (III. xxiv.) 



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OF FINERY IN DRESS 

What is it makes a dog beautiful? 

That excellency which belongs to a 
dog. 

What a horse? 

The excellency of a horse. 

What a man? Must it not be the 
excellency belonging to a man? If then 
you would appear beautiful, young man, 
strive for human excellency. 

What is that? 

Consider, when you praise without 
partial affection, whom you praise: is 
it the honest, or the dishonest? 

The honest. 

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The sober or the dissolute? 

The sober. 

The temperate or the intemperate? 

The temperate. 

Then, if you make yourself such a 
character, you know that you will make 
yourself beautiful; but, while you neg- 
lect these things, though you use every 
contrivance to appear beautiful, you must 
necessarily be deformed. 

Suffer a man to be a man, and a 
woman a woman ; a beautiful man, to be 
beautiful as a man ; a deformed man, to 
be deformed as a man; for you do not 
consist of flesh and hair, but of the 
faculty of choice. If you take care to 
have this beautiful, you will be beauti- 
ful. 

But all this while, I dare not tell you 
that you are deformed ; for I fancy you 
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would rather hear anything than this. 
But consider what Socrates says to the 
most beautiful and blooming of all men, 
Alcibiades : " Endeavour to make your- 
self beautiful." What doth he mean to 
say to him ? " Curl your locks, and pick 
the hairs from your legs " ? Heaven 
forbid! But ornament your choice; 
throw away your wrong principles. 

What is to be done with the poor 
body, then? 

Leave it to nature. Another hath 
taken care of such things. Give them up 
to him. 

What! then must one be a sloven? 

By no means, but be neat, conform- 
ably to your nature. A man should be 
neat as a man, a woman as a woman, 
a child as a child. If not, let us pick 
out the mane of a lion, that he may not 
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be slovenly; and the comb of a cock, 
for he ought to be neat too. Yes, but 
let it be as a cock, and a lion as a lion, 
and a hound as a hound. (III. i.) 



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THAT THE WILL OF GOD IS MY WILL 

HAVE ranged my pursuits under the 
direction of God. Is it his will that I 
should have a fever? It is my will too. 
Is it his will that I should pursue any- 
thing? It is my will too. Is it his will 
that I should desire? It is my will too. 
Is it his will that I should obtain any- 
thing? It is mine too. Is it not his 
will? It is not mine. Is it his will that 
I should be tortured? Then it is my 
will to be tortured. Is it his will that 
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I should die? Then it is my will to 
die. Who can any longer restrain or 
compel me contrary to my own opin- 
ion? No more than Jupiter can be 
restrained. 

It is thus that cautious travellers act. 
Doth any one hear that the road is beset 
by robbers? He doth not set out alone, 
but waits for the retinue of an ambas- 
sador, or questor, or a pro-consul; and, 
when he hath joined himself to their 
company, goes along in safety. Thus 
doth the prudent man act in the world. 
There are many robberies, tyrants, 
storms, distresses, losses of things the 
most dear. Where is there any refuge? 
How can he go along unattacked ? What 
retinue can he wait for to go safely 
through his journey? To what company 
join himself? To some rich man? To 
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some consular senator? And what good 
will that do me? He is stripped him- 
self; groans and laments. And what 
if my fellow-traveller himself should 
turn against me, and rob me? What 
shall I do? I will be the friend of 
Caesar. While I am his companion, no 
one will injure me. Yet, before I can 
become illustrious enough for this, what 
must I bear and suffer ! How often, and 
by how many, must I be robbed! And 
then, if I do become the friend of Caesar, 
he too is mortal; and, if by any acci- 
dent he should become my enemy, where 
can I best retreat? To a desert? Well, 
and doth not a fever come there? What 
can be done, then? Is it not possible to 
find a fellow-traveller, safe, faithful, 
brave, incapable of being surprised? A 
person who reasons thus understands and 
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considers that, if he joins himself to God, 
he shall go safely through his journey. — 
"How do you mean, join himself?" 
That whatever is the will of God may 
be his will too ; whatever is not the will 
of God may not be his. He who gave, 
takes away. Why, then, do I resist? 
Not to say that I shall be a fool in con- 
tending with a stronger than myself; 
what is a prior consideration, I shall be 
unjust. For whence had I these things 
when I came into the world ? My father 
gave them to me. And who gave them 
to him ? And who made the sun ? Who 
the fruits? Who the seasons? Who 
their connection and relation to each 
other? And, after you have received 
all, and even your very self, from an- 
other, are you angry with the giver, and 
complain if he takes anything away from 

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you? Who are you, and for what pur- 
pose did you come? Was it not he who 
brought you here? Was it not he who 
showed you the light? Hath not he 
given you assistants? Hath not he given 
you senses? Hath not he given you 
reason? And as whom did he bring 
you here? Was it not as a mortal? 
Was it not as one to live, with a little 
portion of flesh, upon earth, and to see 
his administration; to behold the spec- 
tacle with him, and partake of the fes- 
tival for a short time? After having 
beheld the spectacle, and the solemnity, 
then, as long as it is permitted you, will 
you not depart when he leads you out, 
adoring and thankful for what you have 
heard and seen ? — " No, but I would 
enjoy the feast still longer." So would 
the initiated, too, be longer in their 
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•SH Discourses of Epictetus 

initiation; so perhaps would the spec- 
tators at Olympia see more combatants. 
But the solemnity is over. Go away. 
Depart like a grateful and modest per- 
son; make room for others. Others too 
must be born, as you were, and when 
they are born must have a place and 
habitations and necessaries. But if the 
first do not give way, what room is there 
left? Why are you insatiable? Why 
are you unconscionable? Why do you 
crowd the world ? — " Ay, but I would 
have my wife and children with me too." 
Why, are they yours? Are they not 
the giver's ? Are they not his who made 
you also? Will you not quit what be- 
longs to another, then? Will you not 
yield to your superior ? — " Why, then, 
did he bring me into the world upon 
these conditions?" Well, if it is not 
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worth your while, depart. He hath no 
need of a discontented spectator. He 
wants such as may share the festival, 
make part of the chorus, who may rather 
extol, applaud, celebrate the solemnity; 
he will not be displeased to see the 
wretched and fearful dismissed from it. 
For when they were present, they did 
not behave as at a festival, nor fill a 
proper place, but lamented, found fault 
with the deity, fortune, their compan- 
ions; insensible both of their advantages 
and their powers, which they received 
for contrary purposes, the powers of 
magnanimity, nobleness of spirit, forti- 
tude, and the subject of present inquiry, 
freedom. — " For what purpose then 
have I received these things? " — To use 
them. " How long? " — As long as he 
who lent them pleases. If, then, they 
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are not necessary, do not attach your- 
self to them, and they will not be so; 
do not tell yourself that they are neces- 
sary, and they are not. (IV. i.) 



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HOW TO SAVE ONESELF 

Do men lose nothing but money? Is 
not modesty to be lost? Is not decency 
to be lost? Or may he who loses these 
suffer no damage? You, indeed, per- 
haps no longer think anything of this 
sort to be a damage. But there was once 
a time when you accounted this to be 
the only damage and hurt; when you 
were anxiously afraid lest any one should 
shake your regard from these discourses 
and actions. See, it is not shaken by 
another, but by yourself. Fight against 
yourself, recover yourself to decency, to 
modesty, to freedom. If you had 
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formerly been told any of these things 
of me, that any one prevailed on me to 
commit adultery, to wear such a dress 
as yours, to be perfumed, would not you 
have gone and laid violent hands on the 
man who thus abused me? And will 
you not now then help yourself? For 
how much easier is that assistance ? You 
need not kill or fetter or affront or go 
to law with any one, but merely to talk 
with yourself, who will most readily be 
persuaded by you, and with whom no 
one hath greater credit than you. And, 
in the first place, condemn your actions; 
*but when you have condemned them, 
do not despair of yourself, nor be like 
those poor-spirited people who, when 
they have once given way, abandon them- 
selves entirely, and are carried along as 
by a torrent. Take example from the 
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wrestling masters. Hath the boy fallen 
down ? Get up again, they say ; wrestle 
again till you have acquired strength. 
Be you affected in the same manner. 
For, be assured that there is nothing 
more tractable than the human mind. 
You need but will, and it is done, it is 
set right; as, on the contrary, you need 
but nod over the work, and it is ruined. 
For both ruin and recovery are from 
within. 

" And, after all, what good will this 
do me?" — What greater good do you 
seek? From impudent, you will become 
modest; from indecent, decent; from 
dissolute, sober. If you seek any greater 
things than these, go on as you do. It 
is no longer in the power of any God to 
save you. (IV. ix.) 



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OF ATTENTION 

When you let go your attention for a 
little while, do not fancy you may re- 
cover it whenever you please; but re- 
member this, that by means of the fault 
of to-day your affairs must necessarily be 
in a worse condition for the future. 
First, what is the saddest thing of all, 
a habit arises of not attending; and 
then a habit of deferring the attention, 
and always driving off from time to time, 
and procrastinating a prosperous life, a 
propriety of behaviour, and the thinking 
and acting conformably to nature. Now, 
if the. procrastination of anything is ad- 
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vantageous, the absolute omission of it is 
still more advantageous; but, if it be 
not advantageous, why do not you pre- 
serve a constant attention? — " I would 
play to-day." — What then? Ought 
you not to do it, with proper attention 
to yourself? — "I would sing." — 
Well, and what forbids but that you may 
sing, with attention to yourself? For 
there is no part of life exempted, to 
which attention doth not extend. For 
will you do it the worse by attending, 
and the better by not attending? What 
else in life is best performed by inatten- 
tive people? Doth a smith forge the 
better by not attending? Doth a pilot 
steer the safer by not attending? Or is 
any other, even of the minutest opera- 
tions, performed the better by inatten- 
tion? Do not you perceive, that when 
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you have let your mind loose, it is no 
longer in your power to call it back, 
either to propriety or modesty or modera- 
tion? But you do everything as it hap- 
pens; you follow your inclinations. 

When you say, I will begin to attend 
to-morrow, be assured it is the same 
thing as if you say, " I will be shameless, 
impertinent, base to-day; it shall be in 
the power of others to grieve me; I 
will be passionate, I will be envious to- 
day." See to how many evils you give 
yourself up. — " But all will be well to- 
morrow." — How much better to-day? 
If it be for your interest to-morrow, 
much more to-day, that it may be in your 
power to-morrow too, and that you may 
not defer it again to the third day. 
(IV. xi.) 



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